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Probability Logic Fails in Immitigable
Uncertainty, but Strategic Logic Does Not
We are grateful to Professor Arend (2020) for his
engagement with our work on uncertainty and the
choice of strategic logics (Packard & Clark, in press).
We easily acknowledge that there are reasons to
disagree with our conclusions as they imply a minimization, if not outright rejection, of much of modern behavioral research. It was not surprising, then,
to receive Professor Arend’s (2020) criticisms, which
appear to be based in what we might call the “epistemic camp” (contra our own “aleatory camp”) of
behavioral research.1 The epistemic camp holds all
1

We are unclear whether Professor Arend would place
himself fully into this camp, as he concedes the existence
of immitigable uncertainty, but supposes it cannot be
managed whatsoever. Whether he recognizes aleatory
uncertainty or not, then, the implications are (for him) the
same—only epistemic uncertainty matters in practice.
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uncertainty to be what we, in our article, describe as
“epistemic uncertainty” and has elsewhere been called
“ambiguity” (Packard, Clark, & Klein, 2017)—that is,
there is always a probability distribution that can be
applied to a decision, even if it is unknown and/or
subjectively generated in the mind of the decisionmaker. This assumption is quite seductive, as it allows
probabilistic models to be applied to literally any
choice situation and lends the appearance of scientific
rigor. Professor Arend elaborated this position to conclude that any uncertainty that falls outside of it is essentially chaotic and cannot be managed by anything
beyond luck.
Our contrary position in the aleatory camp is that
this epistemic uncertainty or ambiguity should not be
confused with aleatory uncertainty—they are different
in nature. Thus, there is no valid way to “convert” aleatory uncertainty into ambiguity by imposing a probability distribution onto something that cannot have
one. Most business uncertainty involves such aleatory
uncertainty due, in Knight’s (1921: 311) words, to “the
inherent, absolute unpredictability of things, out of the
sheer brute fact that the results of human activity cannot
be anticipated and then only in so far as even a probability calculation in regard to them is impossible and
meaningless.” Thus, while the probabilistic approach to
decision-making preferred by the epistemic camp has a
place, we, like most managers (Harrison, 1977), reject it
as unrealistic for the majority of real-world choice
scenarios. In the language of set theory, we hold
the typical set of options available to an actor to be
“open” or, more precisely, “infinite” (Packard et al.,
2017), and not “closed,” as is required by probability
theory. This renders the probability-based logic employed in the epistemic camp’s behavioral research,
and in Professor Arend’s critique, “impossible and
meaningless.”
ONTOLOGICAL VERSUS
EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNPREDICTABILITY
Epistemic theorists sometimes accuse aleatory theorists of erroneously theorizing predictive behavior in
uncertainty, where prediction is supposedly impossible. True (ontological) prediction could of course be
impossible, but this is quite different from epistemic
prediction—or imaginatively forming a mental expectation. Thus, their criticism is based in understanding unpredictability as “epistemic,” meaning the
mind cannot form a prediction whatsoever. But aleatory theorists, in fact, reference an ontological “unknowability” or “unpredictability,” wherein a (future)
state of affairs is strictly unforeseeable. As Lachmann
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(1977: 19) put it, “the future is unknowable but not
unimaginable.” That is, one cannot truly know the
undetermined reality that is yet to come—but we are
not claiming that such futures cannot be imagined. As
stated in our article, “attempts to predict aleatorically
[immitigably] uncertain outcomes are possible . . . The
human mind is capable of imagining possibilities and,
from them, forming expectations, even for and within
indeterminate circumstances” (Packard & Clark, in
press: 26).
Let us justify our contention that “unknowability”
and “unpredictability” are ontological claims, as they
might appear to be epistemological claims. What do
we mean when we describe a future state of affairs as
“unpredictable”? A simple answer to this might be
that the causal knowledge needed to predict such an
outcome is unattainable, but let us dig a bit deeper.
Why is that knowledge unattainable? In all such cases,
the states of affairs and causal mechanisms necessary
to sufficient causal knowledge are both unobservable
and non-deducible a priori. In many such cases, as in
the case of free will, its unobservability is due to the
fact that such conditions are yet to be fully determined. Thus, what is meant by “unknowability” or
“unpredictability” is an ontological state of affairs that
is epistemically inaccessible—there is not now any
observational mechanism (whether or not you believe
we might someday devise one) whereby that ontological state of affairs, including causal mechanics,
can be rationally or empirically discovered.
Epistemic unpredictability is a largely useless
concept, a rare result of ontological unpredictability
and extreme anxiety where an individual is unable to
make predictions. In games such as roulette, the
player can and, in fact, must make an outcome prediction when placing a bet. Such an outcome is not
unpredictable in an epistemological sense, but it is
unpredictable in the ontological sense—the player
cannot know what the specific outcome will be
without cheating.
When considering the uncertain contexts of business decisions, which depend on human decisions and
actions, this distinction becomes even more meaningful. Suppose an entrepreneur has a commitment from a
buyer. On this basis, the entrepreneur has a reasonable epistemic prediction of a sale. However,
this epistemic predictability does not extend to ontological predictability—future human behavior is
not utterly knowable because of the problem of free
will, as we put forth in our article. The entrepreneur
does not know the buyer will follow through because the buyer can change their mind. Human action is, ontologically, undetermined until the action
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is actually taken. Contracts and assurances may
reduce such propensities, but perfect predictability
is always impossible due to reasons we outline in
our article.
PROBABILITY LOGIC FAILS IN UNCERTAINTY
A second and perhaps more important challenge
to the epistemic camp concerns its insistent usage of
probability logic in its theorizing of uncertainty—a
context decidedly unfit for such logic. The epistemic
camp has developed extensive theory on the tenuous
presumption that we act as if every decision were
based in probabilities (Berg & Gigerenzer, 2010). It is
on this basis that Professor Arend (2020: 702) supposes that, in aleatory uncertainty, “any approach
must be as (in)effective as any other when it comes to
predicting or controlling the outcome of the event.” In
other words, all uncertain outcome probabilities are
equal, there are no greater or lesser likelihoods, and so
there are no better or worse choices—only luck. This
conclusion is a misapplication of probability logic to
an open-set (non-probabilistic) context. Ontological
unpredictability or unknowability does not imply
that “any outcome can occur,” as Professor Arend
(2020: 702) claims, nor does it imply an utter randomness of outcomes, a presumption that the epistemic
camp simplistically draws from probability theory.
The epistemic camp makes two erroneous inferences with such claims—(1) that an infinite set includes literally everything and (2) that all elements of
an infinite set are equally likely—both of which are
easily discredited. First, infinite sets do not contain
everything—an infinite choice set does not mean that
“any outcome can occur.” The set of whole numbers
is infinite, yet excludes all non-whole numbers—a
much larger infinite set (note that infinite sets can be
larger and smaller). A jailed convict, standing in the
middle of their cell, would have literally infinite
possible directions and distances in which they could
move—a circle has infinite points, as does a geometric
area. However, this does not mean that the convict
could go literally anywhere. An infinite set of options
is constrained by the limits of possibility—a convict,
in fact, has a very small set of infinite options available
to them. That an entrepreneur may have limited resources need not logically imply that the possible uses
for those resources are finite, nor does it mean that the
infinity of possibilities available to the entrepreneur
are unconstrained. Thus, aleatory uncertainty does
not mean “that any outcome can occur.”
Second, we can similarly reject claims that, under conditions of aleatory uncertainty, “no actions
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taken by the decision-maker can affect the range
or the probability of what can occur at the event”
(Arend, 2020: 702) such that all possible outcomes
are equally likely and can only be capitalized on
by luck. This inference is based in the faulty presumption that all undefined probabilities are definitionally equal and, thus, cannot be altered.
That is, if we do not know the precise probability of
an outcome—if a defined probability does not
exist—then the true probability is (or must be assumed to be) equal for each unknown outcome.
Again, this conclusion is contrived from the epistemic camp’s closed-set probability theoretic
tradition, which we reject for the open-set human experience. Such a simplification imposes a
uniform probability distribution for uncertain
outcomes, an assumption we decidedly reject—
probabilities not only are not known in uncertainty (in which case, it would still be unsatisfactory to cast such unknown probabilities as
logically uniform), but do not exist. Except in extremely limited circumstances of pure Knightian
risk, human expectation and judgment are not
properly characterized by probabilities at all,
but by possibilities. Possibilities reflect what can
occur, and are characterized on a spectrum of degrees ranging from impossibility to perfect possibility (Shackle, 1949, 1969). Even in radical
uncertainty (wherein the set of outcomes is infinite), some outcomes are more “possible” than
others, and yet other outcomes are literally
impossible.
Professor Arend infers from this logic that we
suppose that human action cannot alter the possibility of an uncertain outcome. In fact, we act precisely because we believe that we can alter the
possibility of an outcome—if possibilities could
not be altered, we would have no reason to act at all
(von Mises, 1998). The epistemic camp’s reduction
of aleatory uncertainty to “anything could happen” ignores all that we know about causality and
our ability to manipulate it. The point we make in
our article is not that we cannot or should not
predict outcomes or seek to bring them about; it is
merely that any outcomes dependent on the voluntary action of others cannot ever be perfectly
known a priori (i.e., ontological unpredictability),
which lends to especial difficulties for social theorists, such as economic actors (Felin & Zenger,
2017).
Because it is clear that some possibilities are more
likely than others, the epistemic camp has for a
century attempted to apply the framework of
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statistical probabilities to such outcomes, thereby
reducing all behavior to problems of “risk.”2 But
doing so is and has always been a mistake. If behavior
can be creative, if the options available to the actor
are infinite (but not unconstrained), then there can be
no set-theoretic completeness from which probabilities can be derived. Probability theory has little
bearing on human behavior, except in the most limited (“risky”) contexts. We, like Shackle (1949,
1969), advocate a turn away from probability language and theory in behavioral science, and favor
instead a science of comparative “possibility.”
THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESCRIBING
‘BETTER’ STRATEGIES
Let us conclude by rebutting Professor Arend’s
(2020: 702) specific quarrel against us, that “theoretical
prescriptions for better dealing with immitigable uncertainty should not be attempted, as logic appears to
indicate it is not possible.” The premise of his argument is that we attempt to “optimize” entrepreneurial
behavior, as if our recommendations for pursuing a
non-predictive decision logic in contexts of comparatively greater immitigable uncertainty entailed some
kind of definitive statement of what is to come. Our
goal is, of course, not “optimization”—we agree with
Professor Arend that “optimization” is impossible,
which we believe is clear from our article.
Professor Arend’s objection that “theoretical prescriptions for better dealing with immitigable uncertainty should not be attempted” runs counter to the
entire fields of strategic management and strategic
entrepreneurship—prescriptive (design) sciences intent on offering theory-based tools for better navigating
unpredictabilities. In fact, such tools and strategies are
useful precisely because of the context of ontological
unpredictability. It is true that a business manager
cannot “optimize” their strategic actions because they
cannot perfectly predict the outcomes of their actions,
nor the actions of their competitors, consumers, or
Friedman (2007: 282) exemplified this view: “In his
seminal work, Frank Knight drew a sharp distinction between risk, as referring to events subject to a known or
knowable probability distribution and uncertainty, as referring to events for which it was not possible to specify
numerical probabilities. I have not referred to this distinction because I do not believe it is valid. I follow L. J.
Savage in his view of personal probability, which denies
any valid distinction along these lines. We may treat people as if they assigned numerical probabilities to every
conceivable event.”
2
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other market actors (Milliken, 1987). But it is precisely
this ontological unpredictability that strategic tools—
such as those provided by the resource-based view, for
instance—are designed to manage, and only within
ontological unpredictability do such strategies become
meaningful at all; otherwise, optimization calculus
would clearly be preferred. By mustering particularly
valuable resources and capabilities, by contingency
planning, through more organic organizing, or by developing and maintaining dynamic capabilities, a firm
puts itself in a stronger position to respond to and
survive unpredicted events. This is not “optimization,” of course. Some unpredicted event could still
cause the firm to fail, in spite of employing best-known
strategies, while another firm with a “bad” strategy
might get lucky. Certainly, better epistemic prediction
would allow better strategic organization, but, in ontological unpredictability, such predictions are innately
unreliable. A good strategy, then, is one intended to deal
with the aleatory uncertainty also, and not just the epistemic uncertainty, by providing the firm with tools
for navigating ontological unpredictability.
But the conclusion we draw in our article, that firms
and entrepreneurs should normatively prefer nonpredictive decision-making logics when confronted
with immitigable aleatory uncertainty, and a predictive or uncertainty-mitigation strategy where the uncertainty is predominantly epistemic—our “advising
firms to be flexible in the face of immitigable uncertainty,” as Professor Arend (2020: 702) put it—was not
our intended contribution. Such strategies, of course,
have been well accepted for years, both in strategic
management (e.g., Mintzberg, 1973) and in entrepreneurship (e.g., Sarasvathy, 2001) contexts. Instead, our
intended contributions are twofold. Our first aim was
and is to advance the case for a scientific turn from the
epistemic camp to the aleatory camp. And our second
goal was precisely in laying out the case for why the
argument—that “theoretical prescriptions for better
dealing with immitigable uncertainty should not be
attempted, as logic appears to indicate it is not possible” (Arend, 2020: 702)—is wrong. Such prescriptions, such as those put forth in effectuation theory,
are very possible once you have the meta-theory right.
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